




Accounting, Ideological and Political Work and Chinese 
Multinational Operations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective 
 
Abstract 
This paper critically analyses the role of accounting in China’s new phase of politically 
driven economic reforms, which is the international expansion of Chinese enterprises. 
In particular, the paper examines how China’s multinational state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) and its managers conceive of, and use, accounting and control practices in 
response to the state’s international political and economic objectives. Drawing upon 
neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony, this study contends that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has sought to create and maintain its hegemony by turning its 
political ideologies into initiatives of “economic development”, articulated through 
intensive ideological and political work exercised from the national to the 
organisational level. The study highlights the role of SOE managers in accommodating 
accounting and control practices in line with the state’s hegemonic and ideological 
demands. Crucially, it reveals the ability of managers to coordinate and balance the 
state’s political ends and the enterprise’s economic interests, where there is a 
selective use of accounting and control practices deployed for reasons beyond their 
economic functionality. This paper argues that it is necessary to include the 
superstructure and economic base of the Chinese state in a hegemonic analysis, and 
to investigate how the managerial cadre engages with ideology building at the 
organisational level. By focusing on the Chinese state’s new political dynamism 
regarding the expansion of multinational business operations, this paper provides new 
insights into the complexity of the motivations underlying the use of accounting and 
control practices in a globalised context. 
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There has been significant research interest in emerging and less-developed countries 
(Hopper, Tsamenyi, Uddin & Wickramasinghe, 2009; Alawattage, Hopper & 
Wickramasinghe, 2007; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2009), particularly in terms of 
how intrinsically ‘Anglo-American’ practices of accounting and control interplay with 
local contexts underpinned by distinctive social, political and cultural factors 
(Alawattage, Wickramasinghe & Uddin, 2017; van Helden & Uddin, 2016). In this 
respect, China has so far offered a fruitful context, mainly because of what appears to 
be an ‘established’ socialist regime, with distinctive and immutable cultural facets 
(Chow, Lindquist & Wu, 2001; Tsui, 2001; Douglas & Wier, 2005; Du, Tang & Young, 
2012).  
What has recently become of more interest, however, is the path of the ongoing 
political and economic reforms adopted by the Chinese institutions and their political 
elite. The latter appear to follow an arguably unique approach to economic 
development and societal transformation, including the evolutionary and selective 
absorption of capitalist ideas during the process (Chow, Duh & Xiao, 2007; Xu, 2011; 
Yang & Modell, 2015), whilst simultaneously maintaining and reinforcing political 
control and thus the legitimacy of the one-party system (Chinese Communist Party, 
CCP). It is the interplay of these different economic reforms over time, the recent and 
active pursuance of a political hegemony beyond its national borders, and how this is 
translated at the organisational and managerial level (specifically in terms of 
accounting and control practices) that has caught our attention.   
A strong indication of China’s engagement with a new hegemonic order has been the 
rise of international operations by Chinese state-owned entities and other Chinese 
multinational corporations (MNCs). Recent studies in international business and 
management, policy research and human resource management have revealed 
relatively unique forms and discourses of management, strategy and policies adopted 
by managers in Chinese MNCs (Kernen & Lam, 2014; Cooke, 2014; Quer, Claver & 
Rienda, 2012; Cui & Jiang, 2012). The Chinese model of MNC development has 
arguably become an imperative, as reflected by its increasing outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI)1 policies, which have led to a dramatic growth in Chinese MNCs. 
This is particularly manifested in Africa (and admittedly more globally now), as 
illustrated by the achievement of ‘near monopoly’ positions in the telecommunication, 
mining and construction industries of many African countries (Grimm, 2014; Wang & 
Elliot, 2014). These events reflect the intent of China’s latest economic reforms, 
underpinned by a politically-led OFDI strategy and a re-orientation of government 
policies with regards to state-owned enterprises (SOE) (Grimm, 2014; Wang & Elliot, 
2014; Huang, 2011). This prompts us to explore the recent patterns of accounting and 
control practices in this new phase of economic reform (namely the expansion of the 
                         
1 Statistics shows China’s OFDI had reached over 140 billion US dollars in 188 countries in 2018, which 
makes China the second biggest foreign investor in the world. Sourced from the ‘2018 Statistical 
Bulleting of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment’, jointly published by the Ministry of Commerce 





multinational and international operations of SOEs), leading to the following research 
question:  
How do SOE managers conceive of, and use, accounting and control practices in the 
multinational operations of SOEs, in pursuance of the political and economic objectives 
of the state and of the Chinese Community Party (CCP)? 
To this end, we analyse the trajectory of a construction SOE company’s overseas 
expansion from the start of the Chinese economic reforms to the present, and to 
theorise the role, design and use of accounting and control practices in its overseas 
operations during the most recent period of economic development. Our empirical 
material is drawn from documentary evidence, interviews and field visits to a Chinese 
state-owned multinational construction enterprise, referred to anonymously in this 
paper as ‘International GS’. The case design was firstly inspired by recent studies in the 
Chinese public sector concerned with the evolutionary nature of China’s reform 
policies while being mindful of agential power, interests and practices at the micro 
level (Chiwamit, Modell & Yang, 2014; Yang & Modell, 2013, Zan & Xue, 2011). 
Although these studies exposed the retention, and reinforcing, of the state hegemony 
during the previous periods of economic transition, the co-existence of market-
oriented practices (and the underlying capitalist ideology) and those of the 
Communist-era, our study analyses accounting and control practices as the 
instruments of the prevailing political hegemony of international expansion and the 
managers’ own engagement with such practices.  
In terms of the study’s theoretical standpoint, we rely on neo-Gramscian 
conceptualisations of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Cox, 1981) and initially draw 
upon prior work on the political and ideological role of accounting (e.g. Cooper, 1995; 
Goddard, 2002, 2005; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008; Spence, 2009; Yee, 2009; 
Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). Gramsci’s original idea of a hegemony relates to the way in 
which the status quo (and the position of the ruling class) is maintained in the presence 
of larger groups with different economic and political interests (Cooper, 1995). A 
hegemonic order is primarily constructed through the diffusion of an ideology that is 
reflected or embodied in social practices, organisations and institutions, thereby 
providing a ‘set of guiding principles’ for individuals to voluntarily adhere to whilst 
maintaining the state’s dominance and status quo. From this vantage point, accounting 
is not in itself an ideology (Cooper, 1995) but nonetheless serves the interests of the 
powerful by virtue of its ability to be ‘naturally’ positioned as a ‘neutral’ provider of 
facts. This characterisation of accounting practices and discourses enables a particular 
ideology and hegemony to prevail and prevents other avenues from being considered.  
However, and proceeding beyond the discursive and largely consensus-building 
features of accounting that are typically analysed at the superstructural level, we argue 
that a practical and managerial engagement with particular accounting and control 
practices at the economic base can also arise as part of the prevailing political ideology. 
It is in this light that we mobilise the neo-Gramscian concept of articulation (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2014) to investigate the materialisation of ideology at the organisational level 
(notably practices known as ideology and political work), and how it informs the use 
of accounting and control practices. Lastly, and in view of China’s increased 
involvement in international political and economic arenas, and the central role played 





international relations to frame the role played by Chinese multinational SOE 
managers (and their accounting and control practices) in the externalisation of China’s 
hegemonic order and the normalisation of its politico-economic discourse at the global 
level.    
We seek to contribute to the literature by highlighting how the use of accounting and 
control practices interplay with Chinese ideology and political work in an international 
setting. Similar to Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008), we first document the co-
existence of a number of traditional and so-called ‘modern’ (Western-inspired) 
accounting and control practices, which are operational mainly in terms of producing 
and communicating information to managers. In particular, we note the design and 
use of a ‘Western-inspired’ project budgeting and target costing system in the case 
study organisation as buttressed by construction-related and traditional practices 
known as Cheng Jian Zhi (military management) and engineering norms. Secondly, SOE 
managers appear to selectively ignore or downplay the rational (technical) 
implications of these accounting and control practices. Instead, they seek to ensure 
that these practices operate in subordination to the hegemonic imperative of ensuring 
China’s international leadership and standing.  
Our attention to accounting and control practices is admittedly purposeful since they 
are one of the most studied themes in the ‘China and accounting’ literature (Tsui, 2001; 
O’Connor, Chow & Wu, 2004; Wu, Boateng & Drury, 2007; Duh, Xiao & Chow 2009). 
Underpinning the evolution of accounting and control practices is not only a response 
to the political mandate of adopting ‘innovative’ managerial practices as part of wide-
ranging reforms (Lin & Yu, 2002), but also as an ongoing interaction with the remnants 
of prior economic reforms and those from the Communist-era planned economic 
system.  
The remainder of the paper starts by briefly reviewing the prior work on accounting 
and control practices in China. Gramsci’s (1971) tenets, insofar as they relate to the 
study of accounting and the role of the state are reviewed, followed by neo-Gramscian 
conceptions (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Cox, 1981). This is followed by a description of 
the methods, setting and design of the case study, inclusive of the challenges in 
engaging in such analysis. We then provide an overview of China’s economic reforms 
with an emphasis on the construction industry and the design and use of accounting 
and control practices in the case study company’s current multinational operation in 
light of our theoretical framework. We conclude the paper by summarising our main 
findings and contributions and offering implications for future research. 
2. Literature review 
Prior research on accounting and control practices in China 
The effects of economic reforms on accounting and control practices is a theme that 
has often been addressed in Chinese-based research (e.g. Bromwich & Wang, 1991; 
Firth, 1996; Chow et al., 2007), and as a result, the research focus has changed in 
response to the evolutionary nature of China’s economic development and policies. 
Studies set in the earlier stage of China’s economic ‘journey’ mainly focused on 
examining the adoption and diffusion of western management accounting and/or 





In the main, these studies argued that the introduction of market-oriented policies and 
economic entities such as international joint ventures improved knowledge transfer 
and competition, which in turn provided opportunities for localising western-based 
‘modern’ accounting and control systems in China (Bromwich & Wang, 1991; Yan & 
Gray, 1994; Firth, 1996; Chalos & O’Connor, 2004, Chow et al., 2007). These findings 
were usually compared to practices in state-owned entities, and authors often 
highlighted crucial issues associated with government intervention, state ownership 
and restrictions on managerial autonomy as an impediment to the diffusion and/or 
effectiveness of these market-based accounting and control practices in SOEs (Chalos, 
O’Connor & Zijian, 1999; O’Connor et al., 2004; O’Connor, Deng & Luo, 2006). A third 
stream of studies has been undertaken more recently and has drawn from more recent 
instances of economic reform (e.g. O’Connor, Vera-Muñoz & Chan, 2011; Liu & Pan, 
2007; Xu & Uddin, 2008; Fleming, Chow & Chen, 2009; Tsamenyi, Sahadev & Qiao, 
2011). This work has emphasised the relevance of indigenous factors and local 
managerial notions and approaches in understanding the “Chinese framework of 
accounting system” (Scapens & Yan, 1993). Particular attention has been paid to the 
impact of China’s political economy on the development of accounting (Ezzamel & Xiao, 
2015; Zhang & Andrew, 2016; Gong & Cortese, 2017; Li & Belal, 2018; Modell & Yang, 
2018). This has been, in effect, a departure from the prior investigation of ‘mainstream 
techniques’ and is instead a ‘re-investigation’ of accounting and control practices in 
China with a view to challenging the perceived ‘western predomination’ associated 
with Chinese accounting research.  
A concurrent development has been the improving fortunes and dynamism of Chinese 
SOEs and of the underlying state-driven interests in pursuing economic reforms (Du et 
al., 2012; Chow, 2011). In particular, there has been more attention paid to the political 
(and geopolitical) dimensions of China’s economic reforms and the role played by 
accounting and accountants (Xu, Cortese & Zhang, 2013; Yee, 2012). Yet very few 
empirical studies have analysed these practices from beyond the economic realm to 
reveal the role of China’s social and political process (O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006; 
Hassard, Morris, Sheehan & Yuxin, 2010; Yang & Modell, 2015). The political 
implications have been downplayed, particularly in relation to the overlying of various 
historical junctures associated with China’s economic progress (Duh et al., 2009; Wu 
& Boateng, 2010). Instead, Chinese economic reforms have often been rigidly 
classified as independent historical events (e.g. emergence of joint ventures and stock 
markets, entry to the World Trade Organisation, and the privatisation of SOEs) and 
selectively examined in relation to emergent accounting innovations and practices. 
Consequently, such work appears to have sidestepped the point that economic 
reforms are an evolutionary process that are driven by, and adjusted to, the state’s 
changing political strategies and needs over time (Yang & Modell, 2015). The apparent 
co-existence of conflicting ideologies (underpinning various reforms) and intertwined 
interests of participants within these reforms have been captured in very few studies. 
Mindful of the continued dominance of the state in shaping the economic, political, 
cultural and social landscape in China, we depart from previous studies by mobilising 
the concept of hegemony to investigate the rationale and the means of the state in 
promoting economic reform, and the political implications of such reform on actors at 
the economic level (e.g. SOEs and their accounting and control practices). We 





Gramsci’s notion of hegemony 
For Gramsci, hegemony is defined as a power relationship in which a ruling class, 
rather than principally relying on coercive enforcement, establishes and maintains its 
supremacy by securing consent from the subordinate classes (Bates, 1975). In this 
respect, Gramsci contends that ideology plays a central role in achieving consent, 
because it is formed as a mental framework consisting of a particular set of ideas, 
dominating social thinking in a society, and influencing how individuals construct their 
subjectivity in social relations (Hall, 1986; Yee, 2009). The construction of a hegemony 
is therefore determined by the diffusion of an ideology which guides individuals to 
voluntarily coalesce around a ‘collective will’ that would be in line with hegemonic 
class dominance and leadership (Goddard, 2002; Yee, 2009). This conceptualisation 
further implies that ideology is a purposefully tailored creation through which to 
achieve a political end (Cooper, 1995; Goddard, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2007). The 
political nature of ideology is echoed in Gramsci’s own view that rather than being 
free- floating ideas, ideology has a material existence which prevails in social practices 
and is embodied in the institutions and organisations within which these social 
practices take place (Simon, 1982; Goddard, 2002). This perspective underpinned 
several hegemonic accounting studies which emphasised how a performative ideology 
becomes materialised and entrenched in the accounting domain in the form of 
accounting discourses, regulation making and professionalisation (Richardson, 1989; 
Goddard, 2002, 2005; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Yee, 2012). 2  Those studies revealed 
accounting as an ‘ideological weapon’ (Goddard, 2002), whereby an accounting 
system can be purposefully organised as a malleable object in order to reflect and 
enable different political ideologies as part of their hegemonic processes (Ezzamel et 
al., 2007).3  
Many China-based studies adopted this ideological perspective by explaining how the 
accounting profession responded to the state’s hegemonic demands during China’s 
political and economic transformations (Ezzamel et al., 2007; Yee, 2009, 2012; Xu, 
Cortese & Zhang, 2013, 2014, 2017). Central to their explanation is to envisage the 
state as the key strategic terrain in the process of designing, maintaining and diffusing 
ideologies. These authors found that the CCP, as the dominant power in China, 
strategically worked on ideological aspects to obtain consent for its political and 
economic initiatives, which in turn reinforced and maintained the legitimacy of its 
regime of control (Yee, 2009, 2012; Xu et al., 2013, 2014, 2017). Accounting, in their 
view, represents the functional and material aspects of this ideology, as it is used as a 
tool to promote and naturalise the CCP’s political ideology of “economic development”, 
and potentially to denigrate, exclude and obscure alternative ideas and concepts 
(Ezzamel et al., 2007). This ideology of “economic development” has been 
acknowledged in recent studies in political science, which claimed that China, as a 
                         
2 Cooper (1995) concurred that ideology is “…seen as working through accounting to give certain 
signifiers an authoritative position in terms of their role of helping us to understand the world, and at 
the same time, to silently exclude other ways of understanding the world.” (1995, p. 176). 
3 For instance, accounting concepts such as ‘value for money’ and ‘efficiency savings’ became natural 
ideas (Cooper, 1995) that were crucial to Thatcher’s ideology of ‘small government’; with relatively little 






single-party state, has been building an alternative hegemonic regime by placing 
“economic development” as the central and dominant ideology to ensure China’s 
political hegemony (Su, 2011; Rucki, 2011; Lieber, 2013; Xing & Shaw, 2013). Drawing 
upon the role of the state and the CCP in the ongoing economic reforms, they argued 
that economic development has become embedded as ‘common sense’ in the 
consciousness of the masses and has determined the legitimacy and stability of the 
regime (Su, 2011; Xing & Shaw, 2013). 
Although this hegemonic explanation provides a new way of understanding the 
political motivations behind the development of accounting, alongside China’s 
economic reforms (Yang & Modell, 2015), a relatively unique aspect of the Chinese 
context is the interdependence between the success of the state’s political hegemony 
work and its actions within the economic domain. For example, political appeals can 
be couched in a language of economic initiatives but at the same time, can be diluted 
by material conceptions of economic development (Lieber, 2013; Su, 2011). This type 
of ‘practical’ ideology building is effective in achieving consent because it ensures that 
the legitimacy of the hegemonic group’s control is associated with the state’s 
economic performance, whilst the latter is still seen as serving the major interests of 
the masses. The importance of the economic base in building this ‘practical’ ideology 
further suggests that economic organisations, such as SOEs, play a significant role in 
China’s portrayal and enactment of its hegemony. In this way, our paper seeks to 
respond to calls by previous authors to examine more closely the role and dynamic 
nature of SOE management (and their accounting and control practices) in promoting 
China’s ideology of “economic development” (Du et al., 2012; Chow, 2011). 
Although we argue that a hegemonic analysis can contribute to a better understanding 
of how accounting and control practices are enacted in SOEs (particularly in the 
context of their international activities and investments), we also agree with previous 
authors in terms of the need to unravel the dichotomy of ‘the superstructure and the 
economic base’ in Gramsci’s class-based hegemonic notions4. Originally developed to 
explain ‘class antagonism’ (between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat) within a 
capitalist society, Gramsci stated that it is impossible to impose the ideology of the 
dominant group over society as a whole. Instead, the dominant group needs to 
constantly make necessary compromises and trade-offs during a process of 
‘ideological formation’ (Gramsci, 1971). A successful hegemonic ideology would bind 
different social elements into a ‘historic bloc’, through which the core interests of the 
dominant group can be accepted, maintained and naturalised as a necessity of the 
state and decisive for social unification, leading to structural reproduction (Yee, 2012; 
Joseph, 2000). This idea did offer valuable insights into how developments in the 
economic realm and the formation of accounting professions, regulations and 
discourses worked as a means of forming a historic bloc and materialising political 
ideologies in the accounting realm (Goddard, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2014, 
                         
4 Gramsci’s notions of political society and civil society are usually recognised as the ‘superstructural’ 
constituents of the state representing different power relations in a hegemony. While political society 
is made up of the state’s coercive organs (e.g. the police, the courts, the tax agencies) for legitimating 
and regulating political and economic systems, civil society consists of all other entities with the 






2017), however, the explanatory power of these studies has been limited to the 
construction of ideology at the superstructural level of the state5.  
Instead, we argue that an analysis of state hegemony cannot be comprehensive if the 
economic base of the state is merely conceived as a passive receiver of values and 
ideas from the superstructures, and de facto excluded from a deeper appreciation of 
the aforementioned hegemonic dialogue (Cooper, 1995; Spence, 2009; Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe, 2008). The materialisation of ideology takes place at each level of a 
social structure and players within the economic realm, such as corporate managers 
and employees, are also a dynamic part of a hegemonic bloc. In their study of labour 
control and political hegemony set in Sri Lankan tea plantations, Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe (2008) refer to the ‘mundane of labour control and accounting’ (p. 
303-304) that are used to sustain the political hegemony rather that provide a basis 
for making cost-effective, efficient or profitable decisions. The authors explain how a 
number of communal controls, calculative practices and managerial rituals operate in 
these contexts primarily as instruments to reproduce, represent and validate the 
traditional ‘plantation-economy’ regime of labour control, and thus maintain the 
hegemony of global capital over labour. The records, reports, budgets and meetings 
associated with the production of accounting and control information thus become 
divorced from their technical ‘core purposes’ of managing costs/activities and 
underpinning rational accountability relationships (i.e. between 
owners/managers/employees), and instead mainly serve to ‘illuminate’ or underline 
existing feudal and paternalistic forms of control, and thus maintain a political 
hegemony.  
The above is particularly important to a hegemonic analysis of accounting and control 
practices in China for two reasons. First, it asserts the role of accounting as a 
‘participating’, and not neutral, tool of political hegemony at the economic level. As 
concluded by Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008, pp. 330-331), accounting and 
control practices are not merely rejected or resisted in politically charged 
organisational settings, and instead can serve to reproduce the status of a political 
hegemony. This requires an analysis beyond the boundaries of organisational settings, 
and in our case, emphasis being placed on the Chinese state’s most recent variant of 
its hegemonic order. Secondly, the interdependence of, and interplay between, China’s 
‘ideology and political work’ and the economic dimensions are manifested within 
many Chinese companies. This applies especially to SOEs, given their affiliation with 
both political and economic realms and their strategic involvement in China’s quest for 
reforms that are ‘palatable’ to the prevailing hegemonic order. This study thus seeks 
to address a relatively less discussed angle of analysis by exploring how a state’s 
hegemonic order becomes embodied and enacted at the economic base, as well as 
the political and politicised role of accounting in a multinational SOE (Sassoon, 1980; 
Cooper, 1995; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). In order to facilitate this micro-
                         
5 One of the key arguments is that accounting systems help the state to achieve hegemony because the 
accounting profession and community, as important constitutes of civil society, reflected and balanced 
both coercive and consensual approaches of the state in formulating and enforcing accounting 






perspective and emphasise organisational practices, we mobilise specific neo-
Gramscian conceptions for our theoretically informed analysis.   
Neo-Gramscian perspectives 
In order to empower a hegemonic interpretation that can include the dynamism of 
players at the economic base, it becomes necessary to break away from class 
essentialism,6 which conceptualises the economic base of a society as the dominated 
class and as such, inherently rules it out of the process of ideological formation. This 
original conception of class has been criticised in neo-Gramscian work. For instance, 
Laclau and Mouffe (2014) argued that class is merely one of many collective identities 
that engage in hegemonic social changes. They argued that the logic of hegemony can 
be generalised at every level of society and of social groups, as long as specific relations 
can be established between social elements, with certain social meanings fixed to form 
collective identities that are in accordance with a hegemonic domain (Smith, 2012; 
Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Thomassen, 2016; Wojczewski, 2018). In other words, 
hegemony can be understood as a process of articulation - a struggle for the ‘fixation’ 
of particular meanings and identities in a specific domain, which in turn results in the 
establishment of a hegemonic discourse, such as political ideology. Hegemony can 
thus be seen as the “political articulation of different identities into a common project 
that becomes our social horizon” (Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006, p. 964). This concept 
of articulation underpins the openness of hegemony to social complexity and 
facilitates an investigation of the materialisation of an ideology at the 
industrial/corporate base, for example in terms of how this becomes infused with 
various organisational procedures, processes and practices. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s conception is also useful in understanding the processual nature 
of hegemony. It is generally agreed that a hegemony cannot be permanent since social 
relations within a hegemony tend to be unstable or fail to be reproduced overtime 
(Simon, 1982; Hall, 1984). To maintain and strengthen its hegemonic position, the 
ruling power needs to make constant efforts by (re)balancing political forces and 
interests, (re)shaping state institutions and systems, and (re)constructing hegemonic 
discourses such as ideologies (Goddard, 2002). What Laclau and Mouffe contribute to 
this historical perspective of hegemony is the introduction of key categories that 
facilitates an analytical framework for hegemonic transitions. Central to their thought 
is that a hegemonic transition is within the discursive field, in which particular social 
meanings can be identified and fixed to constitute hegemonic discourses, contingent 
upon the dominant narratives required by the ruling power of a state in different 
hegemonic orders (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Gleiss, 2015).  
Since it is crucial to articulate such discourses in order to target disparate social groups 
with a view to forming a hegemonic bloc, Laclau and Mouffe borrowed the linguistic 
concept of the ‘empty signifier’ to envisage this articulation process (Laclau, 1996; 
Howarth, 2014). They argue that a hegemonic discourse as an empty signifier is 
tendentially emptied of content and therefore capable of adjusting its meaning to 
                         
6 The logic of class simplified the different identities and struggles of a society only to create a conflict 
between classes and prescribed classes or the interests of social groups according to the economic 





unite social groups for hegemonic change. An empty signifier also functions as a point 
of identification, by which diverse social groups, including those at the economic level, 
could position themselves within collective identities by crystallising particular 
meanings and interests (Thomassen, 2016). The articulation is complete when 
collective identities coalesce at a nodal point which turns an empty signifier into a 
privileged signifier representing the dominant hegemonic discourse. While the 
hegemonic discourse is always open to re-articulation, since hegemony is historically 
cumulative in nature, different meanings and identities can be fixed in the empty 
signifiers at different nodal points throughout the ongoing hegemonic process (Smith 
2012; Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Gleiss, 2015).  
The historical characteristic of hegemony is reflected in China’s unique development 
path and is found in its political driven economic reforms7. In this sense, Laclau and 
Mouffe’s concept of articulation is able to provide a holistic framework (refer to Table 
1) with which to analyse China’s economic development as a cumulative process of 
hegemonic building. Specifically, we contend that the discourse of “economic 
development” is a materialised ideology which is commonly accepted by different 
social groups to create a unified identification. As an empty signifier, “economic 
development” can be attributed different meanings and identities arising from 
adjustments in the hegemonic order, which is also capable of embodying itself at the 
material and economic levels in the form of different economic policies and 
mechanisms. Economic policies and mechanisms at different stages of economic 
reform thus operate as nodal points which crystallise and privilege particular meanings 
and identities in order to articulate the state’s hegemony within its economic system. 
This enables us to further explain the experiences and actions of various players in 
articulating hegemonic orders with economic activities (Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe, 2008; Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). In particular, we ask how the managers 
and directors of multinational SOEs identify their own roles/work within the prevailing 
hegemonic order of “economic development” and interact with existing accounting 
and control practices (Mantzari & Georgiou, 2018). 
China’s hegemony vs. international societies 
We identify Chinese multinational SOE as an important flagship of hegemonic 
articulation at the economic level, mainly because of its significance in China’s 
economic reforms over the last decade. In particular, there has been a significant shift 
in national strategy from the domestic to the global market supported by 
government’s OFDI and reflected in terms of the overseas expansion of Chinese state-
affiliated enterprises (Grimm, 2014; Wang & Elliot, 2014; Huang, 2011). The “global 
                         
7  In particular, it is well-accepted that China’s economic reform proposal in 1978 represented a 
reorganisation of the CCP’s hegemony from a Soviet-like communist country based on economic 
planning and class struggles, to a socialist state with greater reliance on market-oriented ‘economic 
development’ policies and practices. The concomitant changes in accounting and control practices have 
been described as a representation of economic transition, reflecting the demands of maintaining the 






rise” of China’s economy since 2008 has resulted in debate and controversy8 in the 
areas of international politics and business studies (Buzan, 2010; Rucki, 2011; Strange, 
2011; Zhang, 2018; Trindade, 2018), although there has been little attention from the 
accounting literature regarding this particular development. It is acknowledged that 
the unprecedented economic development of China has evolved from a domestic 
pursuit to one that seeks global impact through a so-called ‘war of position’ involving 
a “slow, hidden conflict, where forces seek to gain influence and power” (Peng, 2018, 
p. 53). This is further reinforced by China’s increasingly assertive foreign policies, such 
as the One Belt One Road plan, as well as proactive adjustments in economic initiatives 
enabling China to take leadership and initiative on the world economic stage (Trindade, 
2018; Overbeek, 2016; Nolke, 2015; Foot, 2006; Campbell, 2008). It would thus be 
relevant to take into account the rising international influence of China’s intertwined 
politics and economy in our hegemonic analysis. In effect, the way in which the 
underlying hegemonic logic of recent economic reforms operates remains in question9 
(Buzan, 2010; Strange, 2011; Zhang, 2017; Peng 2018) and, specifically, the way that 
such hegemony is articulated with economic activities (i.e. accounting and control 
practices) has not yet been investigated (Ezzamel et al., 2007; Yee, 2009, 2012; Xu et 
al., 2014, 2017). 
In this sense, we sought to broaden our theoretical framework by re-envisaging the 
hegemonic construction of a state as the process of developing its relationship with 
international society, for which Cox’s conceptual nexus of hegemony and international 
relations has been incorporated into our theoretical framework (Cox, 1981; Bieler & 
Morton, 2004). As a neo-Gramscian, Cox advocates Gramsci’s key thoughts about the 
historic bloc10 and argues that a hegemonic arrangement becomes configured by the 
specific context of a state and of its historical structure and political struggles. This 
suggests that the different forms of the state are the expression of particular historical 
blocs (Bieler & Morton, 2003). More importantly, Cox argues that once the historic 
bloc of a state has been consolidated domestically, it can manifest itself as an 
international phenomenon, thereby outwardly expanding its hegemonic arrangement 
on the world stage (Saull, 2012). In other words, changes to international relations and 
the emergence of alternative forms of world order could be the result of the 
externalisation of a state’s hegemonic project, which either challenges or adapts to 
the existing and dominant hegemony. Cox’s conception provides an insightful lens 
                         
8 Some studies have espoused a positive attitude towards the increasingly influential role of China in 
international society and described China as a revisionist in the current world order, whilst others have 
treated China’s global expansion as a threat to the current international society, which is dominated by 
a neoliberal hegemony, and questioned its sustainability in the long term. 
9 Researchers criticised China’s economic expansion as a means to maintain its socio-political stability 
and a pragmatic solution to over-accumulation in the domestic market. The main argument is around 
the divergence of the economic and political systems behind China’s economic development and 
international expansion. Specifically, the way that a neoliberal, market-based economic sector created 
by the Chinese government is paralleled with and supported by relatively state-centred, one-party 
dominated protectionist political instruments. 
10 Cox (1981) describes a historic bloc as the basis of shared social purposes where a variety of social 
groups and interests coalesce to promote not just a harmony of political and economic aims, but also 





through which to understand China’s increasingly confident economic and political 
policies in the international arena, by which our analysis of the historical structure of 
China’s hegemony and its international expansion can be understood as reciprocal 
relationships between a state’s ideation, material capabilities and institutions (Cox, 
1981; Peng, 2018).  
Firstly, Cox believes that the Gramsci’s ideas of consent are not just nationalistic values 
and understandings of the hegemonic order, but also reflect the prevalent collective 
images of a world order (Bieler & Morton, 2003, Cox, 1981). This understanding allows 
an outward look at China’s ideological transition, in which the configuration of 
meanings and identities in the discourse of “economic development” reflects a 
hegemonic approach to engaging with, adapting to and eventually contributing to 
international economy, polity and society. Secondly, while Cox argues that such ideas 
are enabled by material powers such as resources accumulated internationally, they 
also manifest the importance and necessity of investigating the international 
economic activities of the state as a reflection of hegemonic externalisation. Lastly and 
more importantly, Cox’s conception explicates the vital role of China’s SOEs in 
understanding how changes in the hegemonic order have been articulated at the 
economic level in the form of the state’s overseas economic policies and operations. 
While Cox emphasises that international institutions are amalgams of ideas and 
material resources for stabilising a particular hegemonic order at the international 
level, we contend that China’s SOEs and their managers are the pivotal players in 
China’s latest economic reform and the embodiment of China’s hegemonic 
arrangement in the international arena. These managers have a specific identity and 
ability in articulating political hegemonic demands alongside economic ones, and we 
argue that they rely on accounting and control practices to help justify these demands.     
Overall, and thereby departing from Gramsci’s original notion of political hegemony, 
we adopt the neo-Gramscian notions of Laclau and Mouffe on hegemonic articulation 
and Cox’s hegemonic internationalisation to establish a theoretical framework with 
which to analyse China’s ongoing hegemonic process. This framework specifically 
enables an investigation of how the CCP’s hegemonic visions and discourses are 
materialised into concrete economic activities and organisations, which in turn are 
intertwined with the Chinese state’s political ambition in the global arena. This 
encompassing theoretical framework further allows a response to the current 
accounting research calling for an in-depth analysis of the political nature of 
accounting and control practices in China (Ezzamel et al., 2007, Yang & Modell, 2015; 
Gong & Cortese, 2017). Specifically, it allows us to investigate how accounting and 
control practices, as malleable objects, become purposefully deployed to cope with 
policy changes in the economy in line with the transformation of a state’s hegemonic 
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3. Research case, design and methods 
We focus on the construction industry in view of its determining role in the Chinese 
national economy and of its significance worldwide. The long-standing involvement of 
the state in this sector facilitated our research into the evolutionary nature of China’s 
economic reforms, because the development path adopted by the Chinese 
construction industry has tended to reflect a step-by-step response to state reforms 
and policies over time (Chen, 1998; Corkin, 2012). As an illustration, Chinese 
construction enterprises were one the earliest participants and beneficiaries of 
overseas endeavours due to the diplomacy-led aid-project policies in developing 
countries, including African ones, since the 1960s (Kernen & Lam, 2014). Taking into 
consideration this historical context and experience in overseas operations, the 
interactions between contextual factors and managerial values/perceptions, there is 
scope to enrich conceptions of the multi-faceted role of accounting and control 
practices in emerging and developing economies. At the same time, a hegemonic and 
processual analysis of accounting and control practices admittedly comes with 
particular challenges. Firstly, a longitudinal research design would certainly enable a 
deeper appreciation of the junctures and/or critical events pertaining to shifts in the 
hegemonic order and the concurrent implications for managers as they seek to adjust 
or respond to the new imperatives. Such a design would be challenging to implement 
over time, however, given the very politicised and hegemony-building context in which 
the researcher(s) need to interact with research informants and organisations over a 
relatively extended period of time. Secondly, how does a particular hegemonic order 
become ‘articulated’ at the economic base (e.g. level of managers, institutions), which 
is in a given international arena (e.g. a foreign subsidiary), can vary considerably. In 
effect, we can only offer a ‘snapshot’ (in a given time and space) of events at the 
economic base whilst recognising the dynamic nature of the hegemony building 
process.  
Our empirical material relates to International GS, a subsidiary of a large state-owned 
construction group company (Construction GS) in western Mainland China. It was 
established in 2010 as part of the efforts to restructure the development pattern and 
readjust the industrial structure of construction SOEs towards global market expansion. 
International GS has two group subsidiaries in Ghana and Zimbabwe, which are 
responsible for construction projects in more than 16 African countries (see Figure 1).  
Our field study focuses on the company’s headquarters in China, GSLZ, and the 
Ghanaian subsidiary, GSJN. We selected these two research sites because, on the one 
hand, GSJN is one of the biggest overseas subsidiaries of International GS - 
independently registered as a company in Ghana, conducting construction projects 
and other diversified operations in many other African countries. On the other hand, 
GSLZ, as the head office, supports and monitors the operation of GSJN by designing 
accounting and control rules for overseas operation, setting profit objectives, 






Figure 1. Organisational structure of International GS 
 
The first author (who is a Chinese native) spent two months conducting interviews and 
documentary reviews relating to the development of International GS and the design 
of accounting and control practices for overseas operations at GLSZ. This field trip 
eventually facilitated accessibility to the GSJN field during a three-week field visit to 
gather first-hand data about the accounting and control practices in ‘real’ overseas 
operations. GSJN’s closed and self-sufficient work environment (a building complex 
with strict entrance control, comprising offices, accommodation, dining hall and 
leisure facilities) benefited our data collection because the researcher worked and 
lived together with the company staff during the field visit. Data was collected 
informally (e.g. observations; conversations) in addition to the formal interactions. 
Overall 47 semi-structured, formal interviews lasting between one and two and half 
hours were completed (20 in GSLZ and 27 in GSJN). These interviews involved company 
supervisors, department directors, middle level managers within departments, and 
particularly the directors of local subsidiaries and Ghanaian managers in GSJN. 
Appendix A provides a detailed interviewee profile for this case study. Most managers 
required interviews to be recorded through note taking rather than audiotaping due 
to commercial confidentiality and sensitive issues relating to SOEs.  
In addition to interviews, a wide range of documents, including International GS’s 
development chronicle, annual meeting summary and report, management manual 
and other published materials relating to China’s economic reform and the history of 
China’s construction industry, were also reviewed. We also mapped the development 
of the accounting and control practices in relation to the changes in organisational 
structure and strategy, and policies. In addition, we relied on the management manual 
compiled by GSLZ, which explicitly listed managerial rules and regulations for every 
single functional department of GSJN.  
The data collected from the field study was analysed through a step-by-step thematic 





include both English and Chinese versions and most of the latter (33 of 40) were sent 
back to the relevant interviewees for re-examination and feedback. The improved 
transcriptions were reviewed and coded using an open-ended strategy (O’Dwyer, 2004) 
to capture any possible meanings, which were then combined and classified into eight 
first-step themes: ‘politics’, ‘economy’, ‘construction’, ‘overseas’, ‘strategic concerns’, 
budget control’, ‘cost control’ and ‘managers perceptions’. Meanwhile, based on the 
review of archives, we drew a timeline of China’s political and economic reform from 
its establishment in 1949, within which we highlighted significant changes in each 
developmental stage (pre-1978, 78-92 and after 1992) and classified them into a top-
down order consisting of themes such as “political ideology”, “economic system”, 
“industrial characteristics”, “SOE development” and “overseas expansion”. We then 
mapped the first-step interview themes with the themes identified from the review of 
reforms, wherein repeated themes were merged and refined and new themes 
identified. Five second step themes, “strategy”, “design of accounting and control”, 
“ideological and political work”, “project budget” and “target costing,” were identified 
and used as the main topics for data presentation. By incorporating case data with the 
historical review, we were able to provide an analysis of each topic from both a ‘top-
down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, which further cascaded the hegemonic 
analytical framework from political and ideological work at the national level 
(represented as economic reform) to hegemonic construction at the organisational 
level, as well as the effects on, and response from the agents and practices within the 
organisation. 
4. China’s hegemonic progress, economic reforms and 
International GS 
Soviet style Communism - Prior to 1978 
The foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 proclaimed the 
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) regime in Mainland China. As 
the ruling force of China, the CCP’s governance was fundamentally built on Marxism-
Leninism principles which put a primary focus on class struggle between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, so that public ownership was advocated as an 
imperative to eliminate exploitation and class differences (Chen, 2009). The 
dominance of public ownership further paved the way to adopt communist socio-
economic practices, and particularly an economic mode of central planning and 
production inspired by the Soviet Union. This economic mode emphasised the state as 
the central planner, with a top-down administrative chain of command, as a result of 
which enterprises and other economic units were steered like divisional administrative 
units, complying with instructions, tasks and personnel arrangements from their 
parent ministry to aim for and achieve planned production targets; with little 
consideration of the economic consequences. 
Underlying the political and economic systems was the CCP’s aim to achieve a 
communist “new China” with an attitude of rejection and hostility towards capitalism 
and imperialism. As a result, China assumed some responsibility for proletarian world 
revolution by supporting political struggles and providing economic and technical 





Southeast Asia and in Africa (Corkin, 2012; Peng, 2018). While this political standpoint 
inevitably isolated China from the international society dominated by western 
capitalist countries, the diplomatic policy of foreign economic aid was recognised as 
an important means to ensure the worldwide diffusion of China’s communist ideas 
and values (Buzan, 2010). This political significance made the government extremely 
cautious and selective when allocating economic aid projects to enterprises. Political 
and ideological ‘correctness’ was emphasised as a basic premise, for which people 
involved in aid projects must adhere to a firm patriotic belief that working on such 
projects contributed to the national interest, and namely towards the international 
emergence of a communist China (Xu et al., 2014).  
This political imperative led SOEs, particularly those in the construction sector, to 
develop qualified teams to carry out construction aid projects in selected countries. As 
a result, the implementation of Cheng Jian Zhi was examined as the main way to 
identify qualified working teams. As a military terminology, it described a fixed team 
of organisational members with complete sets of specialties, a clear division of labour, 
strict discipline and unified action. The use of Cheng Jian Zhi not only prescribed the 
role of each individual in engineering and construction, but also emphasised a 
centralised approach to administration, in which a collective staffing structure and 
deployment coupled with a high level of compliance to commands were essential for 
the fulfilment of production plans. In other word, Cheng Jian Zhi represents a 
reinforced discipline of compliance, a sense of unity, militarised management mode 
and political recognition. The excellent execution of ‘Cheng Jian Zhi, meant that 
Construction GS, as the parent of International GS, was one of the earliest SOEs 
qualified to conduct aid projects in Africa. Many construction projects, including 
parliament houses, embassies, national stadiums and theatres, were commissioned 
from the 1970s. This success with aid projects was well recognised by African 
governments, which paved the way for Construction GS’s further expansion into the 
African market.  
Socialism for modernisation - 1978 to 1992 
While the CCP’s political initiatives aimed to achieve an alternative form of modernity 
and development that sought to bypass capitalism, the exclusive reliance on radical 
revolutions, such as nationwide class struggles and political campaigns, led to not 
much more than social instability and poverty 11 . As the party’s successor, Deng 
Xiaoping realised that the CCP’s dominance could only be stabilised if the material 
interests of the masses were acknowledged. Class struggle was immediately 
abandoned in 1978 and replaced by new political mottos (Yee, 2009): downplaying 
abstract ideological quarrels, solving problems and testing theories via concrete social 
practices (shi shi qiu shi), and liberating people’s minds from indoctrination to explore 
                         
11In 1959, Mao forcefully initiated the “Great Leap Forward” in order to catch up in a short time with 
Great Britain and the United States in relation to the level of industrialisation (Li & Yang, 2005). This 
unrealistic campaign resulted in deteriorating economic conditions and the masses suffered from 
extreme poverty and hunger. The situation was worsened in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in 
1966 when production and economic development stagnated as class struggle became the most 






new paths and experiment with new ideas (jie fang si xiang). These practical guidelines 
comprised Deng’s concept of “building socialism with four modernisations; an 
encompassing socialist construction to provide a better material life for its people by 
rejuvenating the state’s key fields of agriculture, industry, defence, and science and 
technology (Yee, 2009).  
The economic system thus became the main ‘battlefield’ for achieving modernisation 
targets, starting with China’s prolonged economic reforms. As an evolutionary process, 
the main thrust of these early stage reforms (1978–1992) was to justify economic 
development as the primacy of socialist modernity, for which a pragmatic approach 
was encouraged to introduce market mechanisms as a complement to existing 
economic planning, without considering its underlying ideological designation 
(Ezzamel et al., 2007; Chen, 2009). This inclusive developmentalist idea was reflected 
in the dual track pricing system. This system prescribed the coexistence of two prices 
for the same resource, whereby one represented a state-set price for the delivery of 
the planned production, and the other one represented the market price for the 
remaining part of production sold to the market. The political shift of focus from class 
struggle to domestic economy also demonstrated China’s return to international 
society, whereby China’s revolutionary resistance to the West was abandoned and 
replaced by a milder political view, emphasising co-existence within the status-quo of 
international society dominated by US hegemony. Capitalist metrics were encouraged 
to support socialist China’s development, although such engagement was only allowed 
in economic areas (Zhang, 2017).  
Due to the dominance of public ownership entities within the economic base, the SOE 
has been recognised as the key test bed for piloting market-led ideas. One of the most 
profound reforms for SOEs was the implementation of a Contracted Responsibility 
System (CRS), which sought to design a contractual relationship between the 
government and the enterprise, whereby the latter could negotiate with the former to 
prescribe a fixed target for profit generation and tax delivery, and retain the remaining 
surplus. SOE managers and workers were motivated by this, since their income and 
bonuses were directly linked to production. This idea of ‘contracting’ offered managers 
greater autonomy in construction project management (e.g. resource allocation, 
financial and cost controls, and labour distribution), which particularly benefited 
overseas projects since enterprises such as Construction GS were able to contract with 
overseas governments independently and take full responsibility in terms of the 
quality and profitability.  
These favourable market-led approaches contributed to the rapid expansion of 
Construction GS in the African countries, by establishing local offices in Zimbabwe and 
Ghana in 1988. The enterprise still relied heavily on the Chinese government’s 
endorsement and political assistance, however, in order to access and maintain 
overseas markets. This led not only to profit sharing arrangements between 
government and the enterprise, but also strict compliance with the government’s 
control mechanisms, such as engineering norms. As a practice of the dual pricing 
system in the construction industry, the ‘norm’ refers to a unified and centrally 
controlled price and technical measurement over construction expenditure in terms 
of the unit price of material, equipment and labour usage (refer to example in 





of construction enterprises, since it determines the calculation of construction 
quantities and the pricing and bidding process (Chen, 1998; Sha, 2004). 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics - 1992 to 2008 
Driven by Deng’s idea of ‘fact-based experimentation’, China’s early stage economic 
reforms have often been described as “government-sponsored pilots” where policies 
and practices were carried out on a basis of trial and error (Lieber, 2013). This 
experimental approach inevitably led to detrimental consequences which jeopardised 
the CCP’s political legitimacy12 and questioned its ability to steer economic reforms 
(Xiao, Weetman and Sun, 2004). Chinese society was in stagnation until 1992 when 
Deng made his famous “South China Tour” to restate a determination to build a 
socialist country with ‘Chinese characteristics’ based on the CCP’s leadership and 
market-based economic reforms and opening up13. While the ‘Chinese characteristics’ 
tended to be explained contingently upon China’s development progress, it 
downplayed the superiority of socialism and acknowledged the long-term coexistence 
of China and western capitalist countries within a status-quo international relations 
and governance system. This renewed diplomatic strategy was clearly reflected in the 
political discourse of “Tao Guang Yang Hui” proposed at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Peng, 2018), which marked domestic development and economic modernisation as 
priority national interests, but at the same time it demanded that the country keep a 
low profile and be restrained in the international arena. This political adjustment 
suggested that the CCP’s intention was to adapt with and integrate into the status quo 
of the international order by accepting and complying with western-led rules and ideas 
(Buzan, 2010; Strange, 2011).  
As a result of Deng’s philosophies, economic reforms re-started in a more intensive 
and market-oriented way. “Planned economy” gradually disappeared from state 
propaganda and was replaced by the “socialist market economy” (Xu, 2011). The later 
Opening Up policy further encouraged the introduction of Western-based economic 
theories and market concepts, and various new market and institutional mechanisms 
such as corporatisation, privatisation, shareholding and international joint ventures 
were piloted with overt political support. Economic reforms became acceptable and 
appreciated by the masses because the development of different forms of ‘somewhat’ 
private ownership mobilised the Chinese people to participate in the economic 
                         
12 For instance, the lack of surveillance mechanisms in CRS and dual track pricing system aggravated 
nepotism, corruption and the abuse and loss of state assets (Huang & Duncan, 1997; Yee, 2012; Hassard 
et al., 2010). The masses’ grievances and anxiety with economic reform, along with the appeals for 
political transparency, greater accountability, and freedom of the press and speech, eventually led to a 
radical social movement – the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, which had to be forcibly suppressed 
to restore social stability.  
13 Deng unprecedentedly divorced economic mechanisms from their inherent ideological assumptions, 
whereby any means can be mobilised to serve socialist productive needs, without paying attention to 
lofty theoretical, philosophical and ultimately unproductive debates. As his speech stated: “Planning 
and market forces are not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy 
is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market economy 






transition. This ensured that “developing the economy” became an important idea in 
people’s daily lives (Su, 2011).  
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) further reduced barriers to 
international trading, cooperation and knowledge transfers with the rest of the world. 
In facilitating better international cooperation and integration, the Modern Enterprise 
System (MES) policy was proposed to promote scientific management mechanisms, 
improve technical transformation and implement various means of property rights and 
asset reorganisations. This policy was primarily piloted in SOEs which dramatically 
changed their organisational structures, and some half had become shareholding 
enterprises by the end of 2008. Driven by the MES-based restructuring of SOEs, 
Construction GS experienced a dramatic corporatisation process from 1994 to early 
2000s. The enterprise was re-organised into a provincial shareholding SOE in 2001, 
which led to increased autonomy, particularly in designing and implementing 
management mechanisms for its overseas operations. As a result, many modern 
project management techniques were adopted, which included standardised project 
procedures and regulations, clear managerial responsibilities/boundaries, and 
advanced accounting and control practices such as project budgeting and cost 
management.   
Socialism for a harmonious global community - 2008 to the present 
While China enjoyed unprecedented economic success after its marketisation and 
opening up policies, the runaway economic growth in the recent two decades has led 
to domestic issues such as a worsened environment and pollution, large wealth gap 
and social inequality, which might be potential causes of social and political instability. 
In order to mitigate these negative impacts, the CCP promptly renewed its political 
discourse as “building a harmonious socialist society”. This suggested a heightened 
consideration of the overall societal balance and harmony around the major economic 
reform policies for socialist development. The concept of ‘harmony’ soon extended to 
an international dimension, namely a “harmonious world for the community of 
common destiny” (Zhang, 2018). These discourses sought to portray the world as the 
common community of all humankind, who should work together cooperatively and 
peacefully to achieve the common goal of world prosperity, regardless of national and 
ethnic differences. Central to this grand picture is the proactive expression of the 
willingness and responsibility of the Chinese government in leading and contributing 
to regional/global public goods in the new era of socialist development of China.  
This political redirection has been projected onto economics and resulted in Sino-
centric economic and development systems and institutions such as the expanding 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the founding of BRICs New Development Bank 
and the One Belt One Road initiative (Campbell, 2008; Zhang, 2017; Trindade, 2018). 
While it is argued that these outward-looking economic initiatives were designed to 
maintain China’s economic growth and to address wealth and production over-
accumulation in the domestic market, they also politically conveyed the image of a 
responsible and peaceful rising superpower, calling for international partnership with 
“wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits” (MOFCOM, 2017). Such 
international prospects have been publicised to Chinese people alongside a “Chinese 





collective effort, socialism, national glory, and eventually the revitalisation of the 
nation in the international arena (Wang, 2014).  
At the same time, this discourse of intensified economic transitions should not be seen 
as an acceptance of the capitalist liberal economy. Political-led OFDI has become one 
of the most important approaches to exercising international economic initiatives for 
which Chinese SOE has always been the first point of contact with other players in the 
neoliberal-based global market, however, state control remains ubiquitous, albeit 
evolved into more implicit and focused mechanisms (Chen, 2009). For instance, the 
National Commission for Development and Reform (NCDR), founded in 2006, is 
responsible for devising five-year national economic plans, although these ‘plans’ are 
now announced as prospective guidance rather than a mandate. The enterprises’ 
obedience to government policy is encouraged because political support, protection 
and benefits are expected as a return on this obedience. The state-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established as a specialised 
third party for supervising and guiding the major decisions and activities of SOEs. 
Although the state appeared to visibly withdraw from the running of operations, 
central control over SOEs was tactically preserved via SASAC’s political instructions 
embedded in performance evaluation benchmarks, personnel appointments and 
employment rules, and the enterprise’s investment proposal (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006; 
Chiwamit et al., 2014). The establishment of a ‘party branch’ in each SOE further 
asserted the CCP’s leading position as the enforcer and guarantor of the SOE’s 
development. As a unit operating in parallel with the new business structure, the 
‘party branch’ reflected the managers’ dual identities in SOEs, since managerial 
positions/appointments needed to be validated by corresponding authorities within 
the Party’s hierarchy (Scott, 2002). 
These changes reflected the CCP’s strategic redirection in the function of SOEs in the 
international economy. Economic initiatives professed by the NCDR and SASAC 
indicated a change in the state’s role, from ‘controller’ to that of investor and 
shareholder of SOEs. The state-led development model was extended to overseas 
markets under the CCP’s proposal of Zou Chu Qu (going outside); an improved version 
of the Opening Up policy promoting China’s industries and enterprises via 
international trade and cooperation, export and import and overseas investment and 
operations. The construction industry was recognised as an exemplar with which to 
pilot Zou Chu Qu, mainly because of its previous experience in aid projects. In 2010, 
the central government proposed the “Special Issue of Twelfth National Five-year Plan 
(2011-2015) for Construction Industry”, within which an ambitious economic goal (15% 
increase of annual output) was set for the industry and highlighted that the 
achievement of such target would rely greatly on overseas expansion driven by China’s 
ODFI. This plan also asserted the industry’s significant role in driving China’s export-
led economic growth, since increased overseas construction projects typically provide 
other industries with more opportunities for international trade. Consequently, the 
central government also instructed overseas SOEs to explore and conduct diversified 
operations based on host country conditions, to help bridge trade opportunities 





In response to the government’s increasing demand for SOE overseas expansion, 
Construction GS was restructured into a group corporation with renewed strategies14. 
As a result, International GS was established in 2011 to manage and conduct overseas 
operations on behalf of Construction GS. While the strategic shift also reflected top 
management’s concerns about saturation in the domestic market, the decision-
making was primarily motivated by political reasons since strategic adjustments and 
the following restructuring of International GS reflected the government’s change of 
tack. Specifically, International GS consists of three domestic sub-companies (GSMT, 
GSLS, and GSEE) as the support and service centres for providing material supply, 
labour service and equipment allocation for overseas centres. ‘Diversification’ was 
extensively practiced in local subsidiaries such as GSJN. While three of the six 
subsidiaries in Ghana focused on the construction industry (CSC for building 
construction projects, GSID for equipment leasing and real estate development, GSM 
for concrete processing and brick manufacturing), GSJN also reached other industries 
in terms of pharmaceutical manufacturing (SP), commodity trading (GSIT) and hotel 
management and travel agency (GSIHM).  
Hegemonic discussion of the Economic reforms  
As part of the CCP’s evolutionary hegemonic building process, China’s political 
transition from the foundation of the state in 1949 to the present can be categorised 
into four hegemonic orders, each with a political agenda and associated discourse(s). 
Overall, this process was initially an active response to the political crisis that emerged 
from the Communist period (1949 – 1976), with an emphasis on class struggle and 
Soviet-like domination. The socialist adjustment since 1978, proposed in the aftermath 
of the political turmoil, were an attempt to restore the CCP’s legitimacy by re-orienting 
the party to a consent-based hegemonic governance which considered the common 
interests of the masses and the material demands of different groups. Since then, the 
CCP’s hegemonic construction has always been centralised around the fundamental 
idea of socialist development, accompanied by political appeals ranging from 
‘modernisation’ to ‘Chinese characteristics’ and on to ‘harmonious global community’ 
(Zhang, 2018). These reflect timely adjustments to the CCP’s hegemonic order in 
response to the economic progression of domestic China, and the need to adopt an 
increasingly influential role in the international arena.  
This hegemonic pathway resonates with the findings from previous studies in China 
(Su, 2011; Lieber, 2013; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Yee, 2012), wherein ideological 
transitions gradually made “market oriented economic development” the dominant 
ideology in China. The ideological term “economic development” has been effectively 
used as an empty signifier (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Howarth, 2014; Thomassen, 2016), 
and its meaning was constantly revised and modified to adapt o political needs under 
different hegemonic orders. For instance, “economic development” was initially 
                         
14 In its ‘Ninth Five-year Summary Conference’ in 2012, the chairman of Construction GS explained that 
new strategies represent the resource reallocation by which the construction business will be 
complemented by diversified operations in terms of real estate, technical consultancy, project design, 
engineering manufacture and new material development. It also shows a willingness to expand 
overseas operations as one of the three major sectors of group business and source of profit, in which 





portrayed as the means to achieve modernity and prosperity and thus direct people’s 
focus away from class struggles (1978-1992). ‘Economic development’ was then 
endowed with the idea of openness to facilitate domestic developments and China’s 
smooth integration with the international order (e.g. World Trade Organisation) and 
its underlying capitalist ideas (1992-2008). While China began to demonstrate its 
global influence and leadership (from 2008), “economic development” then became 
the determinant intermediary of this transition, and also a platform where an 
individual’s quest for achievement and the national interests coalesce (the Chinese 
Dream) to deliver the renaissance of the nation.  
Selecting the economic domain as the main field of ideological diffusion is arguably 
the key to the success of CCP’s hegemonic building. It provides a concrete workplace 
facilitating individual participation and then forming consent (Su, 2011; Lieber, 2013). 
Arguably, the masses can more easily perceive and be influenced by changes in the 
economy because of the closer and significant relationships between the economic 
system and people’s daily lives and material interests. The economic domain is also 
the most accessible and actionable field in which common people participate, where 
the increase in personal wealth and improved living conditions could reinforce 
people’s confidence and belief in “economic development”. In this sense, the ongoing 
economic reforms were not merely changing aspects of the economy, but also led to 
a moral and intellectual process seeking to materialise the CCP’s political ideology 
(Gramsci, 1971). The CCP, based on its policy making and adjustment and pervasive 
propaganda, mobilised the masses to take part into the invisible economic battlefield 
as part of their normal practices; and the party itself was positioned as the moral and 
intellectual leader determining the parameters of the battle (Yee, 2009; Ezzamel et al., 
2007).  
From an economic perspective, changes in the hegemonic order were mainly 
manifested in the party’s compromises and accommodations, which were articulated 
during the key nodal points of China’s economic mechanisms (Thomassen, 2016; 
Gleiss, 2015). This was primarily tested in SOEs with a focus on the mode of interest 
sharing (e.g. CRS and dual track pricing). Economic interests were further shared with 
enterprises and managers when market mechanisms in terms of shareholding were 
promoted by the CCP’s Opening Up policy (after 1992). When greater attention was 
required to the benefits from international markets, SOEs were encouraged and 
motivated to seek profit in foreign markets. As a result, multinational SOEs such as 
International GS emerged, by which the government’s macro-economic deployment 
such as Zou Chu Qu became internalised as part of the enterprise’s strategic directions 
of diversified operations and localisation. The increased benefits and interests 
improved the SOE’s ability to advocate the government’s political and economic 
initiatives, which in turn enhanced the CCP’s hegemony because of the SOE’s leading 
position and decisive effects on China’s economy and society. 
The interactive relationship between the CCP, SOEs and Chinese economy reveal a path 
of hegemony building that is different from Gramsci’s traditional thoughts, which 
focused on consent within civil society under modern capitalist societies (Goddard, 
2002, 2005; Yee, 2009, Xu et al., 2013, 2014). In China, ‘consenting’ SOEs and their 
managers play a significant role in aligning the CCP’s political appeals to the demand 





understandable form, namely a representation of “economic development”. The CCP, 
as the dominant structure of the authoritative state, strategically used its coercive 
mechanisms (SASAC and NCDR) to set a baseline for the consent-based hegemony. In 
other words, the SOEs are able to operate autonomously in the pursuance of 
institutional and managerial self-interest, as long as the assigned political tasks are 
fulfilled, and predetermined ‘boundaries’ are not crossed. This intermeshing of 
coercion and consent suggests that China’s hegemony is built on a uniquely 
interdependent and reciprocal relationship between the CCP and its SOEs. While the 
CCP relies on the economic performance of SOEs for diffusing and claiming political 
legitimacy, SOEs behave somewhat obediently to political instructions in exchange for 
better resources and business opportunities. 
China’s political evolution, along with its economic reform, further revealed a clear 
roadmap of the CCP’s internationalisation of its hegemony to the status quo of the 
international order, which is particularly manifested in recent decades, shown as 
increasingly proactive political discourses and proposals, the emergence of China-led 
international institutions and the expansion of Chinese multinationals driven by the 
government-based OFDI. A fundamentally different logic that distinguishes China’s 
hegemonic expansion from the western mode (e.g. US hegemony), however is its 
exclusive focus on the economic perspective. Underlying China’s reciprocal 
propaganda of “harmonious world community” is the expectation of the peaceful rise 
of a socialist country with integration into the modern market economy, whilst keeping 
itself away from the potential risks of political and cultural convergence with the 
democratic facets of neoliberal capitalism (Strange, 2011; Buzan, 2010). While this has 
been criticised as a pragmatic approach that seeks to take advantage from both sides 
without shouldering relevant responsibilities, whether and how this mode has been 
exercised in the economic practices remains questionable. We can therefore now 
provide a ‘grounded’ explanation of China’s hegemonic externalisation by 
investigating how the current hegemonic order (termed Socialism for harmonious 
global community) is articulated within a multinational SOE. We thus move on to the 
case study with a particular focus on the accounting and control practices that embody 
this form of dynamism in the most recent variant of China’s hegemonic order.  
5. Accounting and control practices in International GS 
‘Modern’ accounting and control practices in International GS 
There has been a consensus among senior managers since the establishment of 
International GS, that developing ‘modern’ accounting and control systems was 
essential for achieving the enterprise’s international strategies. The CFO of GSLZ (the 
headquarters) explained:  
“…ten years ago we could achieve a higher profit in overseas projects because of the 
cheap materials and labour forces from China, but the price differences are 
disappearing and nowadays we are competing with Americans, Europeans and 
Ghanaians and profit is relying on efficient cost control, reduced internal frictions and 
advanced project management…” (LZ5) 
As a result, a uniform managerial manual was developed by GSLZ which includes 





such as job responsibility for managerial positions, project contracting and 
construction methods, material procurement, personnel management and salary 
management. This ‘rule-based’ system was believed to be “the cornerstone for 
establishing a modern, market-oriented enterprise” (LZ1), which was greatly 
encouraged by the central government’s policies of establishing MES in the new era of 
China’s hegemonic expansion in the global economy. The deputy general manager of 
GSLZ commented: 
“...the government’s MES policies made us more determined to get rid of the chronic 
illness of SOE management such as ‘discretion’ and ‘arbitrariness’. It is particularly 
important for our overseas operation as we are required to learn from modern business 
and develop appropriate management system to face the challenge from the 
international market...” (LZ2) 
When considering the above, it was noted that the manager sought to frame the new 
modern enterprise system as one that conveyed the state concerns with 
mismanagement and managerial practice during the previous periods of economic 
reforms. In response to the increasing demand and pressure from the international 
markets, developing budgets at the project level was emphasised as one of the most 
significant practices in order to exercise MES policies in construction SOEs, as one 
manager stated: 
“… (project budget) is the best representation of our changed role from the domestic 
to the international market. It allows us to have an enterprise-level target and plan to 
set our own price for construction projects, in other words, more managerial autonomy 
and economic responsibility in the competitive market.” (LZ13) 
The adoption of project budgets is further highlighted as an alignment with the 
international bidding system based on the approach of ‘listed quantities’. This 
approach prescribes a quantitative list of the labour, materials and procedures 
involved in a project and asks each bidder to provide its own prices for the listed items. 
Bidders can only gain advantage by offering competitive unit prices, which directly 
originate from the company’s budgeting system, thereby showing its capacities for 
management, resource allocation and market research. For International GS, the 
budget is not only a technical enactment of the economic consequences of a given 
activity, but rather helps ensure that the company is eligible to compete in 
international construction markets. The general manager of GSJN remarked that: 
“Ghana follows the western way in legislation, political and economic systems and 
management modes, therefore, the establishment of a project management system is 
not just for managerial purposes, it is also an accredited means which improve local 
acceptance of our company, and it is also a specialty language for communications.” 
(JN6). 
Along with the introduction of a project budget there was a renewed emphasis on cost 
management. Inspired by the notions of target costing, GSLZ established a unified 
framework for each of its overseas subsidiaries, in which a detailed set of rules and 
regulations were prescribed to categorise cost management into three sections, 
namely ‘ex-ante cost estimation’, ‘in process cost accounting’ and ‘ex-post cost 
settlement’. This approach was meant to ensure consistency with the normal flows of 





commitment to adapt to international working practices. Specifically, cost estimation 
is carried out during the bidding stage to support the setting of price and cost targets. 
Cost accounting methods for timely examination and adjustment during the on-site 
construction stage are then conducted for the realisation of cost targets. Finally, 
managers and accountants revise cost target achievement, provide reflective reports 
and apply remedial work (if necessary) during the completion stage.  
The use of target costing was recognised as an effective means by which to achieve 
modern international project management, since it helps an enterprise to set and 
communicate specific procedures, responsibilities and boundaries of cost control with 
each independent project, as one director highlighted in a quarterly management 
meeting: 
“… each project team must set a clear target of cost management, and make sure 
everyone within the team understands and agrees with such a target. It (target costing) 
is not just about cost, but a new logic of management focusing on an individual’s 
responsibility and motivation. It is the method a multinational should have” (JN8) 
It is hard to conclude that the adoption of such accounting and control practices was 
a completely business-minded decision in response to international competitive 
pressures, however. Instead, these practices were greatly promoted by state-backed 
industrial associations and professional bodies, and driven by its underlying 
hegemonic appeals (Huang, Lai, Kao and Chen, 2012). For instance, the project budget 
was not substantially adopted until China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, when the 
Construction Project Management Committee (CPMC), founded by central 
government, started to instruct and promote globally recognised project management 
rules and methods (Chen, 1998). In addition, the adoption of target costing in the 
construction industry was the result of a nationwide campaign driven by the state 
council’s propaganda and promotion of the ‘Han Dan’ experience15 . For many top 
managers in International GS, the changes to, and adoption of, accounting and control 
practices were mainly seen as ‘political’ tasks and in fact, even an obligation, since they 
were part of a leading SOE. A deputy general manager of GSLZ added: 
“Our company (International GS) is a model SOE in Western China and because of this 
we are always expected to be in line with governmental willingness by carrying out 
assigned policies promptly and conscientiously. From the operational perspective, this 
means to respond to the government’s call to adopt modern management systems and 
techniques such as project budgeting and costing. It is not only the main criterion of 
our performance assessment, but also determines the company’s future development.” 
(LZ3) 
                         
15  In the 1990s, Han Dan Iron and Steel Company (a large SOE) successfully implemented a 
responsibility cost control system including target costing in its control package (Lin & Yu, 2002). This 
sheds a light on the managerial innovations in SOEs, which were crucial at the time when most SOEs 
were starting their restructuring process. As a result, in 1996 the State Council made an officially 
announcement promoting the ‘Han Dan experience’ to nationwide SOEs. Learning from ‘Han Dan’ was 
recognised as a politically correct practice, as Vice Premier Wu Bangguo defined ‘in-depth learning from 
Han Dan management’ as a central government’s assignment for SOEs (see 





The development of new management, accounting and practices is thus one of the 
examples of how the CCP’s hegemonic building process were materialised in the 
economic base via the powerful apparatus and political affiliation of the SOE. The case 
findings also reveal the dual identities of top SOE managers, at both head office and 
overseas subsidiaries levels, which facilitated the adoption of ‘state-encouraged’ 
accounting and control practices. Specifically, these managers were not only board 
members of their parent SOE (Construction GS), but also members of the CCP 
Committee of International GS. The managers’ political ties to the government and 
Party prompted them to respond quickly to the proposals, so that the enterprise was 
able to align with the CCP’s hegemonic deployment of economic reforms over time. In 
other words, SOE managers, with their unique identification and capabilities, ensured 
that they played a determining role in forming and maintaining hegemonic blocs 
(Gramsci, 1971; Cox, 1981; Bieler & Morton, 2003), and articulating hegemonic 
arrangements using managerial activities. 
The government also relied on leading SOEs such as International GS to showcase and 
provide feedback on new accounting and control practices before their wide 
dissemination to other SOEs and the domestic market (Li & Belal, 2018). As the general 
manager of GSLZ recalled: 
“Thinking back to the 1990s, we were like ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ while 
exploring the way to operate in overseas markets, and fortunately we finally found the 
‘stones’ by learning and even copying methods and notions from well-performing 
enterprises, no matter whether they were Chinese or not… For the past 20-odd years 
we have been the experimental field for new ideas and methods. It is challenging but 
it is the reason why SOEs are always at the front line between the foreign and domestic 
markets.” (LZ1)  
This sense of mission, along with the rapid adoption and acceptance of accounting and 
control practices, suggests the crucial role of this SOE in building a foundation for the 
externalisation of China’s hegemony. Through years of learning and development, 
these SOEs have not only contributed to economic accumulation in the domestic 
market, but also built a reputation and favourable image in the international economy, 
and thus becoming fully prepared to support China’s latest hegemonic arrangement 
for international influence and leadership. For International GS and its managers, such 
hegemonic dynamism was further manifested in implementing these accounting and 
control practices in the workplace, although they appear to have been used in a rather 
selective or sometimes conflicting way. This is discussed further below.  
Engineering norms & Cheng Jian Zhi 
While the project budget has been officially adopted as an ‘essential’ and ‘modern’ 
accounting practice with which to underpin modern project management systems, a 
somewhat unexpected empirical finding (given China’s emphasis on detailed rules and 
procedures) was that there were very few detailed rules and little guidance on how to 
prepare the project budget. When prompted about this, some managers argued that 
preparing enterprise-level budgets is not at the top of their to-do lists because a 





“…in China, construction is still being classified as a national strategic industry, which 
means government sets the prices for the resources involved in construction work 
activities. Therefore, our attention is given to an examination of the construction 
quantity as the basis for pricing, and how you organise your resources, labour forces 
and on-site work during the construction…” (LZ11). 
This argument reflects the fact that engineering norms practices are still extensively 
used for project budgeting in International GS, although this government-led fixed 
pricing system has been downgraded from a governmental mandate to policy 
guidance in the domestic market. While International GS repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of modern project management and actively participated in the 
international bidding process, the adoption of project budgeting was thus rather 
superficial because it failed to establish enterprise-specific prices and costs. The 
insistence on maintaining the engineering norms arose from the manager’s own view 
that:  
“…we have to follow the international rules by giving a ‘market’ price to complete the 
bills of quantities; however the price was really dependent on China’s domestic market 
which is instructed by engineering norms. It is a natural choice, especially when the 
major part of our construction resources come from China.” (JN18) 
Underlying International GS’s reliance on domestic supplies for external 
markets/bidding was the enterprise’s active response to the government’s hegemonic 
order of externalisation (Zou Chu Qu policy). Overseas SOEs were encouraged to 
stimulate Chinese industries by creating export and cooperation opportunities. Rather 
than adhering to the policy in a reluctant way due to the coercive nature of the 
instruction, this hegemonic demand featured ‘enthusiastically’ in International GS and 
included the establishment of three domestic sub-companies which handled the 
material, labour and engineering equipment supplies to the overseas market. As the 
director of GSMT stated: 
“For a long time we traded with suppliers on behalf of local government as we were 
(GSMT) a part of the procurement department of Construction GS before the 
establishment of International GS. There are greater political implications in the new 
era of Zou Chu Qu as we now work to bridge domestic material suppliers with our 
overseas projects in a hope that both sides would benefit from the political dividend 
(the policy of Zou Chu Qu16 encouraged in 12th Plan).” (LZ9)  
Many previous studies conceptualised China’s political context as a ‘constraint’ on the 
operation of accounting and control practices (Xu & Uddin, 2008; Li & Tang, 2009; Zan 
& Xue, 2011; O’Connor et al., 2011; Yang & Modell, 2015). In a similar vein, the mixed 
use of a ‘modern’ project budget and ‘traditional’ engineering norms by International 
GS managers seemed contradictory and unhelpful. Such a co-existence is possible, 
however, if not necessary, in that it served the common purpose of assisting China’s 
hegemony plan for expansion. While the adoption of the project budget could be seen 
                         
16 The phrase “Zou Chu Qu” can be directly translated as ‘going outside’, which was proposed as a 
significant strategy within China’s economic reform policy by promoting the global impact of China’s 
industries and enterprises via international trade and cooperation, export and imports and overseas 





to improve the acceptance and appreciation of Chinese SOEs in the international 
economy, the use of engineering norms at the same time revealed the SOE manager’s 
tactics for fulfilling their political roles by providing a convenient route for China’s 
domestic exports. This reflected an important economic strategy in light of the CCP’s 
hegemonic process of internationalisation.  
In terms of its influence on the economic perspective, the implementation of 
accounting and control practices has also been articulated with the ideational part of 
the hegemonic transition. For instance, although GSLZ specified three areas in which 
to achieve targeted costs, in practice we found that most managerial attention has 
been on controlling on-site costs. Under the slogan “making projects move”, the 
principle of GSJN’s construction work can be described as a holistic material and labour 
turnover system with a unified schedule of equipment usage allowing for inter-project 
coordination to mitigate duplication of the same costs across different construction 
sites. Mutual communication and coordination among project teams became crucial 
to prepare an overall plan for each project’s resource allocation. According to the plan, 
sufficient materials were delivered to different construction sites at the beginning of a 
planned period to minimise the shipping fees. Workers and equipment were then 
constantly transported from one site to another, thereby seeking to reduce the losses 
associated with work stoppages and mechanical wastage. The implementation of on-
site control practices greatly relied on precision, discipline and compliance with the 
overall scheduling, reflective of the military management traditions inherited from 
Cheng Jian Zhi. One project manager commented that the “construction site is as same 
as battlefield, where obedience to command is the key” (LZ17).  
While this apparent ‘regression’ to old managerial modes was advocated to ensure on 
time project delivery and cost control, managers’ favourable attitudes towards this 
control practice was not merely borne out of its technical benefits. A manager 
commented: 
“I think you have heard this too many times, but I still need to say, military 
management is our spirit – comply with commands and contribute to the collective 
good. It is a spirit inherited from the most difficult period of the company and the 
country; it represents our discipline, diligence and unity. Hence we need this to 
motivate morale in real work, which is particularly important at the current time as 
local employees and our young managers may not understand the essence underlying 
this approach.” (JN15) 
Arguably, this comment suggests that what lies behind the persistence of Cheng Jian 
Zhi is the continuation of core ideas and values from the socialist development of China, 
namely the primacy of national interests, the pursuing of unity and collaboration, and 
collective efforts for the common good. In the new era of China’s hegemonic 
internationalisation, all of these goals were presented as determining factors in 
providing an alternative form of Chinese leadership and influence at the global level. 
In other words, rather than the ideational shackle that many previous studies 
portrayed (Li & Tang, 2009; Yang & Modell, 2015), what became embodied in the 
implementation of traditional approaches such as militarised management was the 
SOE managers’ spontaneous response to the state’s hegemonic externalisation, and 





been expressed in managers’ emotional attachment to these historic methods and the 
underlying SOE spirit. As one GSJN manager stated: 
“Although the company has learned and developed to have a similar structure and 
management as western companies, we still don’t want to lose our SOE identity. It is 
not only for gaining acceptance by the state, favourable policies and more 
opportunities for inter-government cooperation. It is the principle and unique merits of 
being a Chinese enterprise and how we distinguish ourselves from western companies. 
It is particularly important when working abroad, we need to remember that we are 
not only representing ourselves, but also the image of the country behind us.” (JN16) 
In contrast to many previous studies which recognised preference/insistence of 
Chinese SOEs for historical accounting and control practices as barriers to, or a sign of 
resistance to, modernisation, we suggest that the coexistence of modern and 
traditional practices in SOEs arises from the purposeful design of the CCP’s 
deployment of the hegemonic order by showcasing the government’s determination 
to incorporate and contribute to the global economy, whilst retaining its political and 
ideological objectives to become an alternative global superpower. In other words, the 
functionality of accounting and control practices was not the primary concern of the 
SOE and its managers. Building on the words of Cox (1981, p. 135), managers may 
move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them, and 
“…to the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing historical structure, they 
buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a rival 
structure” (1981, p. 135). What therefore predominates in the use of accounting and 
control practices is the underlying political interests, which we conceptualise as part 
of the key activities and programmes within the company: ideological and political 
work.  
Ideological and political work 
During the in-depth interviews, it was noted that managers, particularly those in GSJN, 
admitted that the enterprise’s ‘bottom-line’ economic performance has been 
sometimes compromised by the political outlook on the implementation of accounting 
and control practices. The deputy general manager of GSJN commented: 
“Ghana is nothing like China, policies, economy, currency and market, in here all of 
these can change very quickly. A very profitable project at the beginning would end up 
with nothing, and that’s something unmanageable with our current approaches, which 
paid less attention to the market. Besides, our militarised management is not so 
welcomed by local people which sometimes led to delays in construction work.” (JN3) 
Inevitably, such a compromise could not convince everyone in GSJN and some 
managers expressed their concerns about the financial viability of the enterprise’s 
overseas operations. One project manager stated: 
“… Our company is very politically oriented as we spent more time and energy on 
politics than business. We could have had better management but there is always 
something beyond business in real work. For example, we have to carry out some 
unprofitable projects simply because it is an assigned political task as a part of inter-





When faced with the commercial realities and the financial logics flowing from the 
accounting and control practices, International GS managers reverted to a form of 
‘communal’ controls (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008) to help mitigate the 
contradictions involved in managerial activities and decision-making. These communal 
controls are typically known as “Si Xiang Zheng Zhi Gong Zuo” in Chinese, or ideological 
and political work. The concept of ideological and political work was initiated in the 
1950s by Mao, the then party leader, and was then constantly promoted by the CCP 
to become a concrete and indispensable social and educational activity in Chinese 
organisations and the education system. Drawn from communist classics, this work 
sought to instil certain political ideas, views and standpoints as the guidance and 
baseline for people’s social behaviours. The content of such work is regularly updated 
to reflect the CCP’s latest political directions, which are conveyed to individuals by an 
organisation’s party branches via mandatory (mainly in state-owned enterprises and 
universities) learning activities.        
In International GS, ideological and political work has been effectively tailored and 
adopted by managers seeking to ‘harmonise’ their conception of hegemonic progress 
when political and economic interests ‘collide’. Initiated by the CCP’s branch of 
International GS, the essence of such work, as reflected in its managerial manual, is:  
“a work to ensure that the political and ideological thoughts of overseas teams are 
consistent with the Party and the state’s current political directions and economic 
deployment. The work must be conducted on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, 
Dengism… and exercised to improve communication, solidarity and business 
management.”  
This ‘work’ has been consistently recognised as the lifeblood of SOE activity and 
strategy, through which specific practices and methods were designed, and including 
the adoption of accounting and control practices. In effect, such work materialises the 
political nature of multinational SOEs and seeks to embed government policy and 
political thoughts as part of the learning and reflection process of Chinese managers 
and employees. The HR director commented: 
“…most importantly we must ensure that everyone in this company understands three 
questions: why we are here? what make us unique from others? and what do we stand 
for?... and the answers can be expressed in three sentences – 1. our identity as CCP 
member, Chinese citizen and SOE employee is unchangeable, 2. our responsibility to 
create revenue, to dedicate ourselves to our job roles and to win honour for our country 
is unchangeable, and 3. our ideals and conviction to socialism is unchangeable”.  
For GSJN, this broad target has been broken down into specific aspects to match local 
conditions. Routine seminars and learning sessions are organised to discuss and share 
thoughts regarding new political guidance. Chinese expatriates are organised into 
groups to receive patriotic education via reading articles or watching videos. 
Retrospective learning and exhibition events about history of Construction GS and the 
experiences of its working model are advocated, within which the old generation’s 
discipline, compliance to the collective, diligence and hard work are particularly 
admired traits. Furthermore, the SOE’s path of development, including the adoption 
of modern accounting and control practices and ‘success,’ are portrayed as an 





role in the country’s development. Chinese expatriates working in Africa, especially 
those newly recruited or at a younger age, are thus expected to appreciate the 
nationalist ‘spirit’ of this enterprise and their work abroad as an honoured ‘mission’. 
As one manager stated: 
“…When we first came here (Ghana) in 70s, we had nothing but local suspicions and 
hostility, it is not just because we are strangers but also because China was poor back 
then. Some thirty years passed and we are now one of the biggest construction 
companies in Ghana and we couldn’t have achieved it without the support of our 
country which is getting stronger and more powerful because of the CCP’s lead…For 
the ideological work, we must let our young people know the history, the close bond 
between us and our country, and make them proud of what they are doing here. We 
are not just working for our own benefit but also as a part of our country’s prosperity 
and renaissance, as only a strong China can lead us to a bright future.” (JN4) 
This nationalist connotation facilitated Chinese employees to embrace a unified 
understanding of their ‘identity’ in a foreign country, within which their own work and 
contributions are elevated as contributions to the state, and their loyalty to the CCP is 
highlighted and interpreted as a patriotic act. In this sense, the ideological and political 
work served the purpose of creating consent for the CCP’s hegemonic direction at the 
enterprise level, through which the ideological discourses such as “peaceful rise” and 
“Chinese Dream” find their concrete realisation in the overseas operation of SOEs. 
Ideological and political work has also been entrenched within people’s daily life and 
personal welfare. Many ‘showcase windows’, providing government and Party 
information, were set up in workplaces and halls of residence. For project teams far 
away from the headquarters, a CCP sub-branch synchronises practices with the 
headquarters level. More importantly, top managers are requested to “link political-
ideological work with the resolution of employee’s practical problems”, for which 
improving the employee’s material and cultural life, solving the employee’s emotional 
and morale problems, and supporting and comforting the employee’s family in China, 
are also recognised as important parts of the ideological and political work. As the 
general manager explained: 
“Ideological and political work would unite thoughts and create a cohesive, disciplined, 
and efficient team with high morale. However, successful work must be realistic and 
starts from what employee cares about… You can’t expect employees to accept your 
opinions and follow your lead if they even don’t like you and accept you. So how do you 
make yourself welcomed? It’s very simple, getting to know each employee’s difficulties 
in daily life, trying to solve their problems and taking care of them. It is especially 
important for those of us who live and work far away from our hometowns without 
any help from the outside.” (JN2) 
The general manager’s comments reflect a specific approach to contextualising 
abstract political work in the workplace by emphasising the mutual communication 
between employees and managers. While employee wellbeing difficulties can be 
communicated, appreciated and solved as part of the enterprise’s political tasks, it is 
more likely to encourage a favourable attitude towards the political work and the Party 
branch behind the work, which in turn promotes consent to the established hegemony. 





working conditions, which enabled the making of collective identities among the 
company’s Chinese expatriates and therefore facilitated the form of a historic bloc that 
is consistent with the state’s hegemonic appeals (Gramsci, 1971; Cox, 1981; Bieler & 
Morton, 2004).  
The use of ideological and political work demonstrated the unique capability of SOE 
managers, with their political acumen and business expertise, in articulating and 
maintaining the CCP’s hegemonic arrangement at the enterprise level. Chinese 
employees were united, and agreed upon specified political goals, whilst queries about 
accounting and control functions were diverted in favour of political imperatives. In 
other words, while the adoption of modern accounting and control practices has been 
appreciated as a necessity for acquiring global recognition for China’s hegemonic 
externalisation, an insistence on traditional methods was also advocated as the 
essence of China’s alternative hegemonic progress. The latter comes as a result of 
ideological and political work which unified the thoughts of Chinese expatriates under 
somewhat contradictory (from an observer’s perspective) working conditions. 
Furthermore, our findings showed that as a return for fulfilling government’s 
hegemonic demand, the ‘self-sacrifice’ that the enterprise might have made at the 
economic level could anyway be compensated. For instance, managers in GSJN 
indicated that they were offered greater support and convenience for participating in 
inter-government cooperation, which resulted in a favourable economic outcome to 
offset the loss generated by their managerial activities. One senior manager explained: 
“…Governmental cooperative projects normally do not go through an open bidding 
process, as we are invited to participate in the project and the construction quantities 
and price are negotiated between us and the government. It is a much flexible 
approach and we can strive for more favourable conditions, not to mention that we 
could avoid intensive competition in the open bidding process…” (JN3)  
The implementation of ideological and political work, combined with the selective 
adoption of accounting and control practices, thus reflected the significance of the 
multinational SOE as a state apparatus in the latest stage of China’s hegemonic 
externalisation. While SOE managers purposefully design and equip their overseas 
operations as the frontline of China’s state international expansion, a reciprocal 
relationship between the government and the SOE is established which supports the 
latter in continuing its overseas expansion as a response to the former’s hegemonic 
arrangement.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper set out to explore how accounting and control practices operate in the 
multinational operations of China’s state-owned enterprises in the context of the 
state’s politically driven economic reform. In line with the theory of hegemony 
(Gramsci, 1971; Joseph, 2002), we sought to explain how the CCP, as the monopolistic 
dominant player of the state, created and maintained its political hegemony via the 
discourse of the pursuit of “economic development” and corresponding adjustments 
in accounting and control practices, which are morally and intellectually supported by 
ideological and political work done at the national to the organisational levels. Drawing 





and Cox’s hegemonic internationalisation, our historical investigation incorporates the 
SOE’s accounting development towards the state’s economic and internationalising 
progressions, thereby cascading the hegemonic analysis from the superstructural level 
(Goddard, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Yee, 2009) to the economic and enterprise levels. 
This further enabled us to identify the multinational SOE as the important apparatus 
in China’s latest hegemonic externalisation, in which SOE managers as ‘state agents’, 
greatly facilitated the CCP’s hegemonic building of practices by accommodating 
accounting and control practices in line with political and ideological demands.  
Consequently, our paper makes two key research contributions. Firstly, hegemonic 
accounting studies explain the accounting system as a social and political means with 
which to obtain the consent that is necessary for the dominant group to maintain its 
supremacy (Cooper, 1995; Goddard, 2002; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). In 
this sense, hegemony is a purposefully designed ‘strategy’ (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015) 
through which the dominant group’s ideas can be easily conveyed to the dominated 
groups. While this top-down approach is important to understanding the political 
nature of accounting, it seems that a hegemonic analysis has remained bound within 
the superstructures of a state: the power relations between the political and civil 
societies and the latter’s ability to develop and diffuse consented ideas and values, for 
example, in terms of accounting regulations. Our case study, by investigating the 
hegemonic building and maintenance within a multinational enterprise, brings to light 
the less mentioned ‘economic base’ of a state and its role in hegemonic development. 
It is clearly evident that rather than a passive receiver of the state’s hegemonic 
instructions, the case enterprise actively accommodated and coordinated with the 
state in the hegemonic process, in which accounting and control practices are 
developed and used purposefully to articulate the state’s political demands with the 
enterprise’s management and operations.  
Secondly, this paper also contributes to the ideological perspective of hegemonic 
accounting analysis. While Gramsci’s idea of ‘materialised ideology’ has been 
interpreted as the formation of accounting discourse, regulation and 
professionalisation as the embodiment of ideology (Goddard, 2002, 2005; Ezzamel et 
al., 2007; Yee, 2009), this paper, by mobilising Laclau and Mouffe’s key concepts of 
‘articulation’, ‘empty signifier’ and ‘nodal points’, developed an analytical framework 
to explain how manufactured ideological objects (e.g. economic development, 
accounting and control practices) evolve, are perceived and exercised in economic 
practice, and its underlying hegemonic arrangement over time. This new research 
angle further responds to the recent call to explore the reflections from an agential 
aspect, such as industrial practitioners, or ideological hegemony (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015, 
Mantzari & Georgiou, 2018). Our case study in China offers a contribution to the 
agential analysis of hegemony by explaining how top SOE managers articulate political 
ideologies and hegemonic demand alongside the enterprise’s economic activities in 
the overseas markets. We contend that a focus on the wider role of accounting and 
control practices in the context of multinational operations, mediated by ideology and 
political work, serves to bring insights beyond the mainstream dialectic of Western vs. 
non-Western practices. 
The concept of hegemony has been increasingly appreciated and adopted in China-





economic mechanisms and accounting practices under this specific regime of control 
(Yee, 2009; Xu et al., 2014, 2017). However, previous studies tend to overemphasise 
the history of the state’s building of ideological hegemony and its embeddedness in 
the accounting realm, for which researchers heavily relied on second-hand data and 
cross-sectional primary data such as official archives and government documents. 
Although a historical investigation is also important for our analysis, our in-depth case 
study of a large multinational SOE provides empirical evidence offering new insight 
into China’s politically driven economic reform and policies, and particularly its current 
path of seeking global influence and increased overseas expansion (Grimm, 2014; 
Wang & Elliot, 2014; Huang, 2011). While many recent studies do investigate the 
significant influence of Chinese government, and the concurrent politically driven ODFI, 
state owned enterprise (SOE) transformation and corporate governance on the 
establishment and development of Chinese MNCs (Lu, Tao & Yang, 2010; Cho & Huang, 
2011; Klossek, Linke & Nippa, 2012; Huang, 2011; Quer et al., 2012; Cui & Jiang, 2012), 
our hegemonic analytical framework could help future research to shed light on the 
understanding of China’s political and economic initiatives and dynamism in global 
markets, as well as the design and use of accounting and control practices in the 
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